Is Humanism a Religion?

I'm not going to lie, this article was my written response to a TSA (Thinking Skills Assessment) question done under timed pressure (30 mins). I was encouraged by a couple of people to post this article not only as a means to revive this blog but more importantly to demonstrate academic knowledge in a convenient manner instead of having to forward multiple files to appropriate recipients. As such this article is naturally highly technical and may be off-putting to some readers. My goal is to intersperse a couple of 'directly academic' articles with a few more relaxing ones over the course of the coming months.

---

In order to ascertain whether or not ‘humanism’ is a ‘religion’ one must first define those two terms, whose definitions can often vary vastly. For the purposes of this essay I discern ‘religion’ insofar as its function is concerned and, in that sense, adopt a Nietzschean view of ‘religion’ as any moral system that has universal claims and allows for a free agent. ‘Humanism’ I consider in the modern context, where it connotes a feverish devotion to reason, the scientific method, truth, and agency as distinct from the Renaissance connotation of the term where study of the humanities and enforcement of Romantic values are concerned.

---

On the one hand, humanism can be taken to be a religion as it espouses, very strictly, a certain core set of values over all other values. Namely its devotion to both a priori reasoning and Empiricism as the pillars forming human agency directly contradicts all deterministic accounts of human life and progression. This is the hallmark not only of a Nietzschean conception of religion but of every religion in existence. Whilst the humanist may claim that, unlike religious doctrine, its doctrines aren’t dogmatic and don’t rely on superstitious or metaphysical grounding, the fact that the humanist emphasizes ‘truth’ over all else is evidence of the underlying dogmatic substructure upon which the humanist tradition was constructed. It leaves no room for dissenters adopting a Kantian outlook on epistemology, namely that human beings can never obtain the truth due to our inability to comprehend ‘things in themselves’ nor does it allow one to believe in such concepts as ‘destiny’ and ‘will’.

---

Further, in adopting the values of truth, agency, and reason as the core concepts of humanist philosophy, humanism satisfies Nietzsche’s normative moral structure of all religion. According to Nietzsche, any moral system that emphasizes ‘happiness’ over ‘suffering’, or in other words, whose moral philosophy does not reflect the ‘true nature of the world’ is inherently destructive to the individual. But what does humanism have to do with morality? And how does it reflect happiness when science has produced manifold pessimistic outlooks on the nature of life and the universe? Firstly, due to humanisms emphasizing of a few central values over other values, it can be designated as a moral system as so called ‘humanists’ have to abide by these values (thereby acting morally), if they deviate from these values they are no longer ‘humanists’ (thus they act immorally). Therefore, if inclusion into humanist philosophy is predicated upon adoption of a certain set of values and exclusion is determined by deviation from those values, we see not only a moral structure emerge that attempts to regulate the values people adopt but also a familiar religious structure that has been stripped of its divine imagery.

---

Secondly, although scientific research has produced pessimistic results and human agency itself can be seen to be a bad thing according to existentialists like Satre, the emphasis on truth is in itself an optimistic trait. The implication here is that the belief that ‘truth’ is that which can be attained is inherently optimistic and in Nietzsche’s eyes highly naïve, thereby reflecting humanisms depart from the ‘true nature of the world’ and falling snuggly into Nietzsche’s characterization of the normative structure of religions. 'Truth' is as much a positive value as 'humility' and 'ignorance' is as much a negative value as the concept of 'sin', thus the evident polarization of humanist values as aforementioned constitutes a moral framework, which attempts to direct its followers towards the pursuit of the most 'humanist' (moral) outcome. This tends to color the 'most moral' outcome as that which can yield the greatest 'utility' (in a Benthamite sense), for why should one follow humanisms ultimate value of truth were it not for the promise of some manner of reward? (in humanisms case its 'knowledge for knowledge's sake', in Christianity's case its the idea of 'Salvation' and eternal redemption)

---

On the other hand, humanism is opposed entirely to dogma and superstition. Whilst it is maintained above that a religion still remains a religion even if its stripped of its divine spirit, as religions are fundamentally ways of structuring one’s life according to a set of inherent values, the lack of any definitive value other than truth, agency, and reason allows for humanism to branch out widely into various differing sects. In comparison to a religion like Christianity, which has highly specific values and clear hierarchical structures that lead to the establishment of a value hierarchy culminating in a monotheistic deity embodying all the underlying values, humanism has no such structure. Although it stresses the agency of the individual it does not attempt to restrict behavior as religions do and thus contrary to the above paragraph doesn’t concern itself with the morality of the individual. Although it does emphasize truth, it allows for both empirical and rational explanations of the truth rather than adopting the philosophical tradition of arguing for one or the other and thus ‘truth’ as a value becomes highly ambiguous and subject to interpretation rather than an intrinsic value in itself. Almost all of humanisms values are extrinsically valuable to achieve truth as opposed to religions’ common use of intrinsic values.

---

Overall, whilst humanism can be seen to be a religion it all depends how far down one wants to go in characterizing both religion and humanism. If one adopts a functional view of religion then the answer seems obvious (its pursuit of 'truth above all' is religious dogmatism veiled as secularism), however if one cannot separate the divine spirit from religion or for that matter the employment of dogma and subordination to a single figure in a value hierarchy, then humanism becomes less a religion and more an essential tool for moving through life rather than its end goal.